De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Direction of monetary-base expansion decisions relative to trend. Separate from fiscal.transfer_expansion even when correlated.
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
In 2018-2019 the Maduro government tacitly relaxed enforcement of price and FX controls, abolished the DICOM-DIPRO multi-tier official rate in favour of a single floating rate, and permitted limited dollar-denominated retail transactions. The shift reflected pragmatic accommodation of de facto dollarisation under hyperinflation rather than a formal liberalisation, and FX-allocation institutions remained nominally in place.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.