De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Direction of monetary-base expansion decisions relative to trend. Separate from fiscal.transfer_expansion even when correlated.
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
From 2013 onwards under the Maduro government, the Banco Central de Venezuela became the de facto primary financier of the consolidated public sector, including direct credit to PDVSA and ad-hoc transfers to off-budget funds. With oil revenues collapsing and external market access cut off by sanctions, money issuance and the fiscal deficit became operationally fused, driving hyperinflation that peaked in 2018-2019.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.