Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Successive reforms during the Chavez era diluted the autonomy of the Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV), including the 2005 BCV reform allowing transfer of "excess" reserves to FONDEN, the 2009 Organic Law amendments empowering the executive over reserve management, and continuous appointment of politically aligned governors. The institutional changes opened space for direct central bank financing of fiscal deficits and PDVSA operations.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.