Policies·us_section_301_china_tariffs_2018

Section 301 China Tariffs 2018

USA·2018 – 2019candidate

movestrade openness↓sectoral licensing↑sectoral subsidy↑

What the policy did

The 2018 Section 301 China tariffs, imposed by USTR after the March 2018 finding under the Trade Act of 1974 that China engaged in unreasonable IP-related practices, applied 25% tariffs in three rounds — List 1 (USD 34 billion, July 2018), List 2 (USD 16 billion, August 2018), List 3 (USD 200 billion at 10% rising to 25%, September 2018-May 2019) — covering most US imports from China. China retaliated proportionally. The intended effect was to coerce changes in Chinese IP and industrial-policy practices, eventually settling in the January 2020 Phase One agreement on agricultural and energy purchase commitments.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↓

trade openness

regulatory.trade_openness

Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.

decreased · weak

more protectionist

Tariffs covered roughly USD 350 billion of China-source imports, materially closing US-China trade openness.

↑

sectoral licensing

regulatory.sectoral_licensing

Sector-specific licensing regimes, concentration / quota allocation, state-controlled entry (energy, telecoms, healthcare, banking).

increased · weak

tighter sectoral licensing / more state gating

USTR exclusion-request process administered list-level controls on individual product categories.

↑

sectoral subsidy

fiscal.sectoral_subsidy

Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).

increased · weak

expanded sectoral subsidies

Subsequent USDA Market Facilitation Programme provided USD 28 billion in offsetting farm subsidies.

Enacted by

us_trump_tariffs_2018_2019

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives.

canada_market_liberalisation_vs_state_industry_1988_2024inferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'canada_post_1988' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Developmentalist East Asian states (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China) pursuing active industrial policy — export-discipline, selective credit, state-directed FDI screening, targeted sector promotion — achieved higher long-run real per-capita GDP growth over 1960-2019 than otherwise-comparable countries starting at similar income levels in 1960.

industrial_policy_developmentalist_states_growthinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.sectoral_licensingfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

SUPPORTED — avg ATT across 4 developmentalist cases (KOR/TWN/SGP/CHN) is +1.088 log-points at 40-yr horizon (~+197%). 4/4 cases above the 30 log-point threshold…

supported

Across a broad panel of countries 1960-2019, higher trade openness predicts faster long-run convergence of real GDP per capita toward the global frontier (the United States) than industrial-policy intensity does.

trade_openness_long_run_income_convergenceinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=+6.729e-18, p=0.00881; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

In a panel of middle-income countries 1990-2020, export complexity (Hausmann-Hidalgo Economic Complexity Index) rises more following reforms that improve foreign market access and reduce domestic entry barriers than following expansions of subsidy-only industrial policy.

export_complexity_market_access_vs_subsidyinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

PARTIAL — coef=+4.68e-14, p=0.393; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.

estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred

viaregulatory.trade_openness

PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)

partial

Consumer product variety and price-adjusted welfare improve more after episodes of trade liberalisation and competition-policy reform than after state industrial-policy episodes of comparable duration and scale, in a panel of middle- and high-income countries 1980-2020.

consumer_choice_variety_trade_market_reforminferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.sectoral_licensing

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'competition_reform_episode' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

Lula third-term's Nova Indústria Brasil 2024 industrial-policy package, conditioned on export performance and technology-diffusion metrics, produces measurable sectoral capability gains (semiconductors, green hydrogen, health-industrial complex) by 2030 — replicating the East Asian export-discipline conditionality pattern rather than the earlier Latin American import-substitution-industrialisation pattern.

nova_industria_brasil_export_discipline_pattern_effectinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidy

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING

run pending

Services trade liberalisation predicts stronger total factor productivity growth in high-income frontier economies after 1990 than goods-sector industrial policy does.

services_trade_liberalisation_frontier_growthinferred

viaregulatory.trade_opennessfiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.sectoral_licensing

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['oecd_stan:tfp_growth', 'constructed: EU KLEMS or OECD STAN sectoral TFP for services']

run pending

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Jokowi nickel ore export ban 2020

IDN·2020

match

1.9

trade opennesssectoral subsidysectoral licensing

Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation (HCI) drive — South Korea 1973-1979

KOR·1973

match

1.9

sectoral subsidytrade opennesssectoral licensing

II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento (Brazil, 1974-1979)

BRA·1974