Pre-registration
Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives. In a panel of OECD economies, Canada’s post-1988 cumulative log GDP-per-capita growth and labour productivity are positively associated with trade openness and FDI inflows, while federal industrial-policy spending (proxied by government consumption on economic affairs) does not show a comparable positive association.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
Refuted if the panel-FE coefficient on CAN × post-1988 is negative and significant at p<0.05, or if Canada’s cumulative log GDP-pc gap vs synthetic counterfactual is negative over 1988–2024.
formal test & threshold
test: panel_fe_canada_fta threshold: beta_canada_post1988 > 0 AND p < 0.10; synthetic_gap > 0.
Method
- Template
panel_fe- Fixed effects
country, year- Clustering
country- Sample
- 17 countries · 1988 – 2024
- Evidence type
- causal
Primary: panel FE with CAN × post-1988 interaction. Secondary: synthetic control for CAN using OECD donor pool.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
real_gdp_pc outcome | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2 | log_level |
labour_productivity outcome | world_bank_wdi:SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KDtier 2 | level |
tfp_index outcome | pwt:rtfpnatier 3 | level |
trade_openness outcome | world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2 | level |
canada_post_1988 treatment | constructed:1 for CAN from 1988 onwardtier 5 | binary |
initial_gdp_pc_1988 control | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2 | level_at_1988 |
human_capital control | pwt:hctier 3 | level |
wgi_govt_effectiveness control | wgi:GE.ESTtier 4 | level |
us_policy_rate control | fred:FEDFUNDStier 1 | level |
commodity_terms_of_trade control | world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WDtier 2 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — canada_market_liberalisation_vs_state_industry_1988_2024
Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'canada_post_1988' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
Pre-registration
- Claim: Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives. In a panel of OECD economies, Canada’s post-1988 cumulative log GDP-per-capita growth and labour productivity are positively associated with trade openness and FDI inflows, while federal industrial-policy spending (proxied by government consumption on economic affairs) does not show a comparable positive association.
- Falsification rule: Refuted if the panel-FE coefficient on CAN × post-1988 is negative and significant at p<0.05, or if Canada’s cumulative log GDP-pc gap vs synthetic counterfactual is negative over 1988–2024.
- Falsification test: panel_fe_canada_fta
Estimate
- Error: treatment 'canada_post_1988' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
Variables resolved
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD→ real_gdp_pc (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)world_bank_wdi:SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD→ labour_productivity (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=7444)pwt:rtfpna→ tfp_index (outcome, publisher=pwt, n=6407)world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS→ trade_openness (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10714)constructed: 1 for CAN from 1988 onward→ canada_post_1988 (treatment, publisher=constructed, n=629)world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD→ initial_gdp_pc_1988 (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=12104)pwt:hc→ human_capital (controls, publisher=pwt, n=8637)wgi:GE.EST→ wgi_govt_effectiveness (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5168)fred:FEDFUNDS→ us_policy_rate (controls, publisher=fred, n=1241)world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WD→ commodity_terms_of_trade (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=6478)
Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:52:43+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.