Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
Turkey's post-2016 institutional consolidation, anchored in the State of Emergency Decrees (KHK) following the 15 July 2016 coup attempt and the 2017 constitutional referendum that introduced the executive presidency, dismissed approximately 130,000 public-sector employees, restructured the judiciary (HSK reform), and concentrated regulatory and central-bank appointments under the Presidency. The intended effect was to insulate the executive against further coup risk, fuse legislative-executive power, and centralise economic-policy decision-making — at the cost of internationally observable declines in rule-of-law and central-bank-independence indicators.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.