Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
Turkey's continuation of IMF stabilisation under the AKP, from the 19th Stand-By Arrangement of February 2002 (USD ~16 billion) inherited from the Ecevit coalition through the May 2005 Stand-By (USD ~10 billion), maintained inflation-targeting at the CBRT, primary fiscal surpluses around 6.5% of GDP, banking-sector resolution under the BRSA, and structural-reform conditionality on social security and tax administration. The intended effect was to consolidate the post-2001-crisis macro framework, finance debt rollovers during early AKP years, and embed the disinflation that brought CPI from over 70% in 2001 to single digits by 2004.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.