IESET.
Policies·sdn_exchange_rate_unification_2021

Sudan exchange-rate unification 2021

SDN·2021 – present·enacted 2021-02-21·Civilian-military transitional governmentcandidate
movesproduct market competition↑trade openness↑central bank independence↑

What the policy did

Sudan's transitional government and central bank unified the official exchange rate with the market rate in February 2021 as part of the IMF-monitored reform programme and HIPC debt-relief path. The measure devalued the official rate, reduced multiple-rate arbitrage, aimed to restore remittance and export flows to formal channels, and paired exchange reform with subsidy and fiscal adjustment measures.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
↑
product market competition
regulatory.product_market_competition
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
increased · moderate
more competition-friendly (lower entry barriers)
Unification reduced multiple-rate rents that distorted import allocation and market entry.
↑
trade openness
regulatory.trade_openness
Trade policy openness — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, FTAs, industrial protection.
increased · weak
more open trade
A market-clearing exchange rate aimed to shift trade, remittances, and exports back into formal channels.
↑
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
increased · weak
greater independence (legal, operational, personnel)
The reform supported IMF-monitored macro policy and reduced quasi-fiscal exchange-rate distortions.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.
estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)
partial
Across a broad panel of economies 1980-2020, market reforms (privatisation, trade liberalisation, and price decontrol) produce durable gains in real GDP per capita growth only when rule-of-law scores exceed a minimum threshold (WGI Rule of Law > -0.5, approximately the 40th percentile of the global distribution).
rule_of_law_market_reform_complementarityinferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competitionregulatory.trade_openness
REFUTED — coef=-0.1483 (sign opposite claim +), p=0.00481
refuted
Canada’s long-run prosperity after the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (1988) and NAFTA (1994) is more associated with market openness than with national industrial-policy initiatives.
canada_market_liberalisation_vs_state_industry_1988_2024inferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competition
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'canada_post_1988' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
run pending
Australia’s long expansion after the Hawke-Keating reforms (1983–1996) — including tariff cuts, financial deregulation, competition-policy introduction, and fiscal consolidation — is better predicted by market liberalisation than by sector-specific state direction.
australia_hawke_keating_reform_long_runinferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — coef=-0.03935, p=0.076 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
partial
Estonia’s radical market reforms after independence in 1991 — including a currency board, flat tax, rapid privatisation, and full trade liberalisation — generated a cumulative GDP-per-capita convergence gain of at least 15 log-points by 2024 relative to a synthetic counterfactual constructed from gradual post-Soviet reform comparators (Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan).
estonia_market_reform_30yr_income_convergenceinferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competitionmonetary.central_bank_independence
supported
supported
The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.
soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred
viaregulatory.product_market_competition
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
NZ Rogernomics 1984–1993 liberalisation (tariff removal, SOE corporatisation, financial-market liberalisation) produced productivity acceleration and real-income gains over 1990s–2000s relative to pre-reform trend.
nz_rogernomics_productivity_effectinferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competition
refuted — NZ synthetic-control log-TFP gap mean over 1995-2005 = -3.80% (<= 0); informative log GDP-pc gap = -22.70%. Productivity acceleration claim not suppor…
refuted
Singapore's long-run prosperity and frontier convergence are better predicted by extreme trade openness, strong rule of law, competitive product and services markets, and high economic freedom than by state ownership or industrial targeting alone.
singapore_state_capacity_market_openness_comboinferred
viaregulatory.trade_opennessregulatory.product_market_competition
PARTIAL — coef=-0.0001143, p=0.713 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Convertibility Plan (Plan Cavallo) — Argentina 1991-2002
ARG·1991
match
2.3
central bank independencetrade opennessproduct market competition
Hawke-Keating reform package (1983-1996)
AUS·1983
match
2.3
central bank independenceproduct market competitiontrade openness
Hawke-Keating market reforms — Australia 1983-1996
AUS·1983
match
2.3
trade opennessproduct market competitioncentral bank independence
New Economic Policy — Decree 21060 (Bolivia stabilisation 1985)
BOL·1985
match
2.3
central bank independencetrade opennessproduct market competition
Rogernomics — New Zealand market reforms 1984-1990
NZL·1984
match
2.3
product market competitiontrade opennesscentral bank independence
Balcerowicz Plan — Poland shock therapy 1990
POL·1990
match
2.3
product market competitiontrade opennesscentral bank independence
Yeltsin-Gaidar shock therapy + voucher privatisation (Russia, 1992-1994)
RUS·1992
match
1.8
central bank independenceproduct market competitiontrade openness
Russia — Gaidar shock therapy 1992
RUS·1992
match
1.8
product market competitiontrade opennesscentral bank independence

References

Notes

The later coup and war severely disrupted the reform environment; this entry captures the 2021 policy action and its intended institutional channel.