IESET.
Policies·cl_reforma_educacional_inclusion_2015

Reforma Educacional Inclusion 2015

CHL·2014 – 2018candidate
movestax corporate↑tax progressivity↑transfer expansion↑spending level↑

What the policy did

Ley 20.845 de Inclusión Escolar (Ley de Inclusión) enacted in June 2015 under the second Bachelet government. Phased out shared-financing copayments in publicly subsidised schools, banned for-profit operation by voucher schools, and prohibited selective admissions, replacing them with a centralised lottery-based assignment system. Aimed at reducing socio-economic segregation in Chile's voucher school system.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
↑
tax corporate
fiscal.tax_corporate
Statutory and effective corporate tax rates, treatment of depreciation, and international competitiveness.
increased · weak
higher corporate tax burden
For-profit ban and reinvestment requirement for subsidised operators raised effective tax burden.
↑
tax progressivity
fiscal.tax_progressivity
Progressivity of the personal income tax schedule, including top marginal rates, bracket spread, and targeted credits (EITC-equivalents).
increased · weak
more progressive (higher top rates, wider spread, larger targeted credits)
Companion 2014 tax reform funded the inclusion package via more progressive corporate taxation.
↑
transfer expansion
fiscal.transfer_expansion
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
increased · weak
larger transfer footprint
Replacement of family copayments with state subsidy effectively transferred costs to public budget.
↑
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
increased · weak
higher spending share
Phasing out copayments increased Ministry of Education subsidy outlays per voucher seat.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Large-scale universal or near-universal transfer programmes produce a three-order causal chain.
universal_transfer_programmes_labour_force_participation_declineinferred
viafiscal.transfer_expansionfiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.spending_level
partial — Prime-age LFP fell by ≥1.0pp in 2/5 cases (threshold for SUPPORTED: ≥3). First-order improved in 3/4 cases. Mixed: consistent with the spec's design-d…
partial
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality.
heritage_tax_burden_under5_mortality_income_region_robustnessinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.transfer_expansionfiscal.spending_levelfiscal.tax_corporate
PARTIAL — controlled coefficient not decisive (coef=-0.3884, p=0.7236)
partial
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have lower latest-available under-5 mortality than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_tax_burden_under5_mortality_current_gapinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.transfer_expansionfiscal.spending_level
PARTIAL — gap sign/magnitude not decisive (diff=-1.127, p=0.811)
partial
Large welfare states sustain long-run real GDP per capita growth when paired with market flexibility (low product- and labour-market barriers), trade openness, and fiscal discipline (debt-to-GDP below 90%), but not when paired with rigid product and labour markets, in an OECD and rich- country panel 1980-2020.
welfare_state_market_flexibility_complementinferred
viafiscal.spending_levelfiscal.transfer_expansion
PARTIAL — coef=+3.308e-18, p=0.653; effect magnitude effectively zero
partial
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy.
heritage_tax_burden_life_expectancy_income_region_robustnessinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.spending_levelfiscal.transfer_expansionfiscal.tax_corporate
REFUTED — controlled market-score coefficient has opposite sign and p=0.0005532
refuted
Conditional on latest real GDP per capita and broad Heritage region, countries with higher Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density.
heritage_tax_burden_physician_density_income_region_robustnessinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.spending_levelfiscal.transfer_expansionfiscal.tax_corporate
PARTIAL — controlled coefficient not decisive (coef=-0.09846, p=0.2114)
partial
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available life expectancy than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_tax_burden_life_expectancy_current_gapinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.spending_levelfiscal.transfer_expansion
PARTIAL — gap sign/magnitude not decisive (diff=-2.188, p=0.1386)
partial
Countries in the top quartile of Heritage lower-tax-burden score in 2024 have higher latest-available physician density than bottom-quartile countries, consistent with free-market country policy regimes outperforming less market-oriented regimes on this outcome.
heritage_tax_burden_physician_density_current_gapinferred
viafiscal.tax_progressivityfiscal.spending_levelfiscal.transfer_expansion
PARTIAL — gap sign/magnitude not decisive (diff=-0.6504, p=0.1087)
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.