De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Direction of monetary-base expansion decisions relative to trend. Separate from fiscal.transfer_expansion even when correlated.
President Erdoğan imposed a unorthodox monetary policy framework: despite inflation accelerating from ~19% (Sep 2021) to >85% (Oct 2022), the CBRT repeatedly cut policy rates — with CBRT governors dismissed multiple times for resisting. Rationale articulated by Erdoğan: that high interest rates CAUSE inflation (inversion of standard theory). Lira devalued from ~8.5/USD (Sep 2021) to ~19/USD (May 2023). Post-2023 election: new finance minister Mehmet Şimşek + CBRT governor Hafize Gaye Erkan began orthodox normalisation — rates hiked to 50% by Q1 2024, inflation deceleration followed. Crisis episode + reversal provides an unusually clean natural experiment for central-bank-independence and monetary-expansion-direction axes.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.