De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Direction of monetary-base expansion decisions relative to trend. Separate from fiscal.transfer_expansion even when correlated.
Four CBRT governors served in four years: Murat Çetinkaya dismissed by Presidential Decree 6 July 2019 for refusing to cut rates; Murat Uysal removed 7 November 2020 after a rate-hiking reversal; Naci Ağbal dismissed 20 March 2021 two days after hiking by 200bp to 19%; Şahap Kavcıoğlu installed to deliver the rate-cut cycle that halved the policy rate while CPI accelerated. Pattern codified the principle that CBRT governors could be replaced overnight for policy disagreement, collapsing de facto independence.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.