IESET.
Policies·tr_kkm_unwind_2023_2025

KKM FX-protected deposit unwind (Turkey 2023-2025)

TUR·2023 2025·enacted 2023-08-20·AKP + MHPcandidate
movessectoral subsidyfinancial deregulation

What the policy did

From August 2023 the CBRT and BDDK introduced stepped parameters to disincentivise KKM rollover: reduced remuneration ceilings, higher required-reserve ratios on KKM balances, and conversion targets to standard TRY deposits. KKM stock fell from TRY 3.4trn peak (mid-2023) to below TRY 1trn by Q1 2025 — a reduction of ~USD 90bn in sovereign contingent FX exposure. Programme tightly coordinated with the rate-hike cycle to lift real TRY deposit returns above KKM-equivalents.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
decreased · strong
reduced sectoral subsidies
Stock of implicit FX subsidy cut by more than two thirds in 18 months.
financial deregulation
regulatory.financial_deregulation
Financial-sector regulation — banking separation, capital requirements, cross-border activity rules, derivatives oversight.
increased · weak
tighter financial regulation
Partial rollback of 2021-2023 administrative deposit steering.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

The 2022-2026 wave of major-economy industrial-policy programmes — US IRA + CHIPS, EU Critical Raw Materials Act + Net-Zero Industry Act, EU Chips Act, Japan Green Transformation (GX, ¥150tn / ~$1tn announced), Korea K-Chips + Korean New Deal 2.0, China 14th Five-Year Plan + Made-in-China-2025-2.0 with semiconductors and clean energy as national-security frontier — represents the largest coordinated wave of industrial-policy spending in the post-1970s OECD record.
green_industrial_policy_global_chip_race_2022_2026inferred
viafiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.financial_deregulation
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient observations after listwise deletion (20)
run pending
Major episodes of financial deregulation — the 1999 US Gramm-Leach- Bliley repeal of Glass-Steagall, the 1986 UK Financial Services Act ("Big Bang"), Chile's 1974-1981 banking liberalisation, Sweden's late-1980s credit-market liberalisation, and Japan's 1996-2001 Big Bang — are followed within 10 years by higher-than-baseline incidence of banking crises, measured by the Laeven-Valencia Systemic Banking Crisis Database, and by elevated credit-to-GDP gaps per BIS.
financial_deregulation_crisis_vulnerabilityinferred
viaregulatory.financial_deregulation
SUPPORTED — sign matches claim +, ATT=+0.04145, p=3.34e-07, N=302, treated_countries=8
supported
The 2022 European gas-price shock plus heterogeneous national policy responses (German Doppelwumms ~€200bn relief package, Spanish-Portuguese Iberian gas-price-cap mechanism, Italian energy-aid bridges, French EDF nationalisation + nuclear price cap) produced a divergent industrial- relocation pattern within Europe and across the Atlantic over 2022-2025.
energy_crisis_2022_european_industrial_relocationinferred
viafiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.financial_deregulation
PARTIAL — ATT=+0.1438, p=0.583, N=94, treated_countries=14 (above α=0.10)
partial
The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA, signed August 2022) produced a measurable step-change in US clean-energy investment, manufacturing reshoring, and fiscal cost over 2022-2026 relative to a pre-IRA trajectory and to non-US comparators (EU, China, Japan, Korea).
ira_2022_clean_energy_investment_decompositioninferred
viafiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.financial_deregulation
PARTIAL — coef=+1.688e+04, p=0.886 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Precautionary-principle-based regulation in the EU produces a three-order causal chain relative to the US regulatory baseline.
precautionary_regulation_innovation_productivity_gap_eu_usinferred
viaregulatory.financial_deregulationfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — ATT=+8.614e+04, p=0, N=260, treated_countries=1; claim direction ambiguous
partial
China's strongest total factor productivity acceleration occurred during the WTO-accession period (2001-2008) linked to tariff reduction, foreign competition, and regulatory harmonisation, while the subsequent subsidy-heavy state-direction phase (post-2008, intensifying post-2015) is associated with weaker TFP growth and rising capital misallocation.
china_post_wto_market_opening_vs_subsidy_tfpinferred
viafiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.financial_deregulation
SUPPORTED — shape=ITS, sign matches claim +, mean_gap=+0.1126, z=+3.9
supported
Brazil's Nova Indústria Brasil (NIB) 2024 industrial-policy plan targets six "missions" (sustainable agribusiness, health complex, infrastructure, digital transformation, defence/ bioeconomy, decarbonisation) with R$300bn of subsidised credit + procurement preferences.
lula3_industrial_policy_2023_2026_reshoring_outcomesinferred
viafiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.financial_deregulation
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded
run pending
Chinese state-owned enterprises in strategic sectors (steel, energy, telecoms) post-1978 grew faster than privatised peers in Eastern Europe through the 1990s-2010s, demonstrating that public ownership with planning can outperform market transition.
china_soe_vs_cee_privatised_growthinferred
viafiscal.sectoral_subsidyregulatory.financial_deregulation
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'china_soe_strategic_sector_indicator' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects
run pending

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.