IESET.
Policies·th_yingluck_rice_pledging_scheme_2011_2014

Thailand rice-pledging scheme 2011-2014

THA·2011 2014·enacted 2011-10-01·Pheu Thai-led coalitioncandidate
movessectoral subsidyrule of law

What the policy did

Revived and expanded rice-pledging scheme (จำนำข้าว) under Yingluck Shinawatra's Pheu Thai government, guaranteeing farmers THB 15,000 per tonne of white paddy rice (20,000 for Hom Mali jasmine) — approximately 40-50% above prevailing global price. Government purchased via BAAC and warehoused through Ministry of Commerce. Intended to withhold Thai supply (Thailand was world's largest exporter) to drive up global price; instead India and Vietnam captured market share. Stockpile accumulated to ~18m tonnes by 2014 with substantial physical loss, corruption in warehousing and government-to-government export "deals", fiscal losses estimated THB 500-700bn (~USD 15-20bn). Yingluck later convicted 2017 (five years, in absentia) for negligence over the scheme. Canonical price-support-policy failure case.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
increased · strong
expanded sectoral subsidies
Large off-market price support with cumulative losses ~THB 500-700bn.
unintended / side-effect
rule of law
institutional.rule_of_law
Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
decreased · weak · unintended
weaker rule of law
Extensive corruption documented in warehousing and G2G export deals.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Industrial policy effectiveness depends on governance quality; in low-rule-of-law country samples, state allocation predicts higher corruption and lower long-run GDP growth than in high-rule-of-law samples, in a broad panel of economies during 1990-2020.
industrial_policy_corruption_interactioninferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — interaction term requested but no loadable constructed interaction variable is defined. The generic panel_fe runner would otherwise …
run pending
El Salvador's FDI inflow, real-GDP growth, tourism arrivals, and business-formation rate accelerated under the Bukele era (2019-2024) relative to a Central American peer-country donor pool (Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Dominican Republic).
bukele_fdi_gdp_investment_climate_2019_2024inferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.697, |gap|/pre_sd=1.2, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial
Following El Salvador's perceived success with the régimen de excepción (March 2022 onward) and the homicide-rate collapse, multiple Latin American jurisdictions enacted Bukele-style emergency measures: Honduras (Estado de Excepción in select municipalities, December 2022), Ecuador (Estado de Excepción + designation of gangs as terrorist organisations, January 2024), Peru (Estado de Emergencia in Lima/Callao, 2023-).
latam_bukele_imitation_effect_homicide_security_stateinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — ATT=+0.03571, p=0.598, N=99, treated_countries=1 (above α=0.10)
partial
Under Financial Secretary John Cowperthwaite (1961–1971) and successors, Hong Kong pursued near-laissez-faire economic policy — no capital controls, no industrial policy, minimal tariffs, low flat taxes, and light labour regulation; between 1960 and 1997 Hong Kong's GDP per capita rose from approximately $4,000 to $26,000 (2011 PPP), converging almost fully to UK levels and surpassing most continental European economies.
hong_kong_minimal_state_growth_miracle_1960_1997inferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_lawfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
SUPPORTED — HKG/USA per-capita ratio 1997 = 0.80 (>=0.80); HKG annualised growth 1960-1997 = +5.22%/yr (>=5.0).
supported
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict faster real GDP per capita growth after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
market_order_rule_of_law_gdp_pc_growth_panelinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — coef=-0.08348, p=0.913 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher high-technology export intensity after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
market_order_rule_of_law_high_tech_exports_panelinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — coef=+0.621, p=0.746 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict higher private and total investment shares after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
market_order_rule_of_law_investment_share_panelinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — coef=-0.3477, p=0.814 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Across a pre-registered panel of OECD and major emerging-market economies from 1996 to 2023, stronger rule-of-law institutions predict deeper private credit intermediation after country and year fixed effects and basic macro controls.
market_order_rule_of_law_private_credit_depth_panelinferred
viainstitutional.rule_of_law
PARTIAL — coef=+4.153, p=0.513 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

References