IESET.
Policies·ph_maharlika_sovereign_wealth_fund_2023

Maharlika Investment Fund (Philippine sovereign wealth fund)

PHL·2023 present·enacted 2023-07-18·Uniteam (PFP/Lakas-CMD supermajority)candidate
movessectoral subsidyproperty rightscentral bank independence

What the policy did

Republic Act No. 11954 established the Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF), the first Philippine sovereign wealth vehicle, administered by the Maharlika Investment Corporation (MIC). Initial capitalisation of ₱500 billion (~$9bn) drawn from Landbank and DBP contributions, BSP dividend remittances for the first two years, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) share, and national- government seed equity. Mandate: invest in foreign and domestic assets including infrastructure, strategic industries, green investments and PPP co-investment. Signed by President Marcos Jr on 18 July 2023 after a fast-tracked passage (first-reading to enrolment in ~7 months) that drew opposition from former Finance Secretaries, BSP alumni, and academic economists on governance and opportunity-cost grounds.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
sectoral subsidy
fiscal.sectoral_subsidy
Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).
increased · moderate
expanded sectoral subsidies
Public-capital vehicle directing state-bank and BSP dividend flows toward strategic-sector equity investment; a new channel for targeted state finance.
unintended / side-effect
property rights
institutional.property_rights
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
unchanged · weak · unintended
No expropriation dimension; legal framework is investment-vehicle rather than nationalisation. Governance-safeguard critics flag fiduciary, not expropriation, risk.
central bank independence
monetary.central_bank_independence
De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
decreased · weak · unintended
lower independence (fiscal dominance, politicised appointments)
Mandatory contribution of BSP dividend surpluses to MIF for an initial period was criticised as a narrow impingement on central-bank operational autonomy. BSP retained supervisory independence.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Starting from comparable 1945 post-war conditions — same ethnicity, language, pre-war German institutional and industrial inheritance, and with the GDR inheriting a larger share of pre-war industrial capital in Saxony and Thuringia — the Federal Republic's Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Ordoliberal market economy with welfare state) versus the German Democratic Republic's planned economy with administered prices, state-enterprise production, and soft budget constraints produced by 1989 a canonical divergence that pattern-matches >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from a different publisher or methodology family.
west_east_germany_economic_system_divergence_1950_1989inferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Zimbabwean property-rights deterioration post-2000 (commercial-farm expropriation without compensation) precedes hyperinflation and output collapse; institutional mechanism is necessary, not merely monetary.
zimbabwe_property_rights_output_linkinferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING
run pending
Nationalisation of producing oil, gas, and mining enterprises without preservation of operational autonomy reduces extractor output within 3–5 years of nationalisation and underperforms the counterfactual trajectory for at least a decade.
resource_extractor_nationalisation_reduces_outputinferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — mean_gap=+3.268e+10, |gap|/pre_sd=4, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)
partial
Sectoral nationalisation produces a three-order causal chain.
nationalisation_investment_productivity_decline_venezuelainferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsfiscal.sectoral_subsidy
PARTIAL — VEN real GDP -70.9% from 2013 to 2023 vs donor median 15.5% (ARG/CHL/MEX); underperformance 86.4pp
partial
Collectivised agriculture in the USSR 1930-1940 raised grain marketings sufficiently to finance industrial investment, delivering Preobrazhensky's scissors-crisis resolution despite high rural transition costs.
soviet_collectivisation_agricultural_marketingsinferred
viainstitutional.property_rightsfiscal.sectoral_subsidymonetary.central_bank_independence
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — falsification rule not sharpened — auto-grader refuses to grade against the generic stub boilerplate. Promote the spec (replace fals…
run pending
Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP, 2000-2002) combined with Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe deficit monetisation produced a canonical institutional and economic collapse 2000-2009 that manifests as >=7 of 10 pre-registered extreme-outcome metrics, each drawn from an independent data source and measuring a different causal layer (agricultural-capacity destruction, monetary collapse, output contraction, human-capital flight, humanitarian stress).
zimbabwe_hyperinflation_land_reform_output_collapse_2000_2009inferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Market-compatible land reforms with compensation show stronger post-reform agricultural investment and productivity recovery than expropriatory reforms.
land_reform_compensation_investment_recoveryinferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — coef=-0.2293, p=0.881 (above α=0.1); direction inconclusive
partial
Estonia adopted among the most radical market-liberalisation packages of any post-Soviet state — flat tax (26% universal rate, 1994), currency board (EEK pegged to DM/EUR, 1992), rapid privatisation, unilateral free trade, and minimal capital controls — and by 2007 had recovered to Soviet-era GDP per capita levels and substantially exceeded them, while Belarusian and Ukrainian peers had not recovered comparably.
estonia_market_reform_post_soviet_growth_1991_2007inferred
viainstitutional.property_rights
PARTIAL — recovery threshold pass=True (year_recovered=1998, 2007 vs 1991 = 70.53282727739165); Baltic−CIS gap pass=False (gap=5.1509956229348575)
partial

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

References