Statutory and effective corporate tax rates, treatment of depreciation, and international competitiveness.
Security of private property rights — formal recognition, expropriation risk, titling systems.
Extra-profits levy on Italian banks announced surprise-style by the Meloni government 7 August 2023 under Decreto Asset (DL 104/2023, Law 136/2023 as amended during parliamentary passage). Original design: 40% tax on the portion of 2022 or 2023 net interest margin (NIM) exceeding the 2021 NIM by more than 5% (2022) or 10% (2023), capped at 0.1% of total assets. Share-price reaction wiped ~€10bn of bank market capitalisation in a single session. Parliamentary amendment allowed banks to opt out by allocating 2.5x the levy-equivalent to non-distributable reserves (effectively strengthening CET1 instead of generating Treasury revenue); ~€3.7bn reallocated this way per Banca d'Italia. Ex-post Treasury collection ~€0. Episode analytically load-bearing: demonstrated the coalition's willingness to cross orthodox-coalition business- interest lines on windfall taxation, but the reserve-allocation escape hatch revealed internal coalition pressure (Forza Italia, Lega) against revenue-extraction form. Repeated or extended in subsequent budget negotiations 2024-2025 under different structures.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.