IESET.
Hypotheses·institutional quality·decentralized_property_rights_agricultural_productivity

Across developing and transition economies 1980-2020, secure private or household land-use rights predict stronger agricultural productivity growth — measured by cereal yields, agricultural value added per worker, and total-factor productivity in agriculture — than collective or state-allocation systems over long windows.

The pre-registered claim is that countries with above-median land-rights security show at least 0.8 percentage points higher annual agricultural productivity growth and at least 10% higher cereal yields after 20 years than countries with below-median security, after controlling for rainfall, fertiliser use, and initial agricultural productivity.

INCONCLUSIVEengine/runs/decentralized_property_rights_agricultural_productivity

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['fao:cereal_yield', 'world_bank_wdi:EA.PRD.AGRI.KD', 'constructed: fao_output_index_div_by_input_index']

confidence cueResult card produced; verdict unclassified.

policy briefCoverage too thin

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

This test cannot make a firm call yet. no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['fao:cereal_yield', 'world_bank_wdi:EA.PRD.AGRI.KD', 'constructed: fao_output_index_div_by_input_index']

why it matters

This matters because institutional quality claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 51 country or place units from 1980 to 2020, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Land rights security index
  • Collective allocation dummy
What we checked
  • Agricultural productivity growth
  • Agricultural va per worker
  • Agricultural productivity index
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/decentralized_property_rights_agricultural_productivity
1007550250198020002020CHNINDIDNBRAMEXARGCOL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show agricultural_productivity_growth across 51 sampled countries over 1980–2020.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for decentralized_property_rights_agricultural_productivity. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/decentralized_property_rights_agricultural_productivity/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 5ce4495 · 2026-05-02T19:11:20Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:53:17Z

Across developing and transition economies 1980-2020, secure private or household land-use rights predict stronger agricultural productivity growth — measured by cereal yields, agricultural value added per worker, and total-factor productivity in agriculture — than collective or state-allocation systems over long windows. The pre-registered claim is that countries with above-median land-rights security show at least 0.8 percentage points higher annual agricultural productivity growth and at least 10% higher cereal yields after 20 years than countries with below-median security, after controlling for rainfall, fertiliser use, and initial agricultural productivity.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Not supported if (a) the coefficient on land-rights security is not positive and significant at p<0.05 on agricultural productivity growth, OR (b) the above-median vs below-median mean productivity growth gap is below 0.4 pp/year, OR (c) the collective-allocation dummy is positively associated with productivity growth (suggesting scale economies dominate incentive effects). A collectivist reading wins if (c) holds.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_land_rights_on_agricultural_productivity
threshold: panel_FE_beta(land_rights_security → ag_productivity_growth) > 0 at p<0.05 AND above_median_mean_gap >= 0.80 pp/yr AND collective_dummy_coefficient <= 0 or insignificant

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
51 countries · 1980 – 2020
Evidence type
associational

Panel FE with agricultural-productivity outcomes on land-rights security. Country FE absorb persistent differences in agro- ecological conditions. Identification from within-country land reforms (e.g. China HRS 1978-1984, Vietnam Doi Moi 1986, Ethiopia 1995 land certification, Rwanda 2000s land titling). Event-study around reform episodes as robustness. IV: colonial-legal-origin interacted with time as instrument for land-rights evolution.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
agricultural_productivity_growth
outcome
fao:cereal_yieldtier 2
log_diff
agricultural_va_per_worker
outcome
world_bank_wdi:EA.PRD.AGRI.KDtier 2
log_diff
agricultural_tfp_index
outcome
constructed:fao_output_index_div_by_input_indextier 5
level
land_rights_security_index
treatment
constructed:0.5×fao_land_tenure_security + 0.3×prindex:property_rights_index + 0.2×vdem:land_rights_equalitytier 5
level
collective_allocation_dummy
treatment
constructed:indicator = 1 if dominant land regime is collective or state farmtier 5
indicator
fao_land_tenure_security
treatment
fao:land_tenure_indicatorstier 2
level
rainfall_deviation
control
world_bank_wdi:AG.LND.FRST.ZStier 2
level
fertiliser_use_per_hectare
control
fao:fertiliser_nutrients_per_hatier 2
log
log_initial_agricultural_productivity
control
fao:cereal_yieldtier 2
log
rural_population_share
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.RUR.TOTL.ZStier 2
level
road_density
control
world_bank_wdi:IS.ROD.DNST.K2tier 2
log

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — decentralized_property_rights_agricultural_productivity

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['fao:cereal_yield', 'world_bank_wdi:EA.PRD.AGRI.KD', 'constructed: fao_output_index_div_by_input_index']

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Across developing and transition economies 1980-2020, secure private or household land-use rights predict stronger agricultural productivity growth — measured by cereal yields, agricultural value added per worker, and total-factor productivity in agriculture — than collective or state-allocation systems over long windows. The pre-registered claim is that countries with above-median land-rights security show at least 0.8 percentage points higher annual agricultural productivity growth and at least 10% higher cereal yields after 20 years than countries with below-median security, after controlling for rainfall, fertiliser use, and initial agricultural productivity.
  • Falsification rule: Not supported if (a) the coefficient on land-rights security is not positive and significant at p<0.05 on agricultural productivity growth, OR (b) the above-median vs below-median mean productivity growth gap is below 0.4 pp/year, OR (c) the collective-allocation dummy is positively associated with productivity growth (suggesting scale economies dominate incentive effects). A collectivist reading wins if (c) holds.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_land_rights_on_agricultural_productivity

Estimate

  • Error: no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['fao:cereal_yield', 'world_bank_wdi:EA.PRD.AGRI.KD', 'constructed: fao_output_index_div_by_input_index']

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:AG.LND.FRST.ZS → rainfall_deviation (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8495)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS → rural_population_share (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=16965)

Variables missing data

  • fao:cereal_yield (outcome, name=agricultural_productivity_growth) — vintage not on disk
  • world_bank_wdi:EA.PRD.AGRI.KD (outcome, name=agricultural_va_per_worker) — vintage not on disk
  • constructed: fao_output_index_div_by_input_index (outcome, name=agricultural_tfp_index) — vintage not on disk
  • constructed: 0.5×fao_land_tenure_security + 0.3×prindex:property_rights_index + 0.2×vdem:land_rights_equality (treatment, name=land_rights_security_index) — vintage not on disk
  • constructed: indicator = 1 if dominant land regime is collective or state farm (treatment, name=collective_allocation_dummy) — vintage not on disk
  • fao:land_tenure_indicators (treatment, name=fao_land_tenure_security) — vintage not on disk
  • fao:fertiliser_nutrients_per_ha (controls, name=fertiliser_use_per_hectare) — vintage not on disk
  • fao:cereal_yield (controls, name=log_initial_agricultural_productivity) — vintage not on disk
  • world_bank_wdi:IS.ROD.DNST.K2 (controls, name=road_density) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:53:17+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

FAO land tenure indicators are patchy and often ordinal. PRIndex property-rights module has limited country coverage. The composite index will have substantial missing data; this is flagged as the primary data dependency.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.