IESET.
Policies·yu_imf_stabilisation_1982_1988

Yugoslav IMF stabilisation programmes 1982-1988

YUG·1982 – 1988candidate
movesspending level↓monetary expansion direction↑

What the policy did

Repeated IMF stand-by and extended-fund-facility programmes following 1982 request. Conditioned on dinar devaluations, fiscal consolidation, import restrictions, real-interest-rate positive maintenance, and self-management reform. Kraigher Commission 1982- 1983 Long-Term Programme of Economic Stabilisation diagnosed structural problems but republican veto prevented implementation.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended
↓
spending level
fiscal.spending_level
General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.
decreased · moderate
lower spending share
IMF conditionality forced federal fiscal retrenchment.
unintended / side-effect
↑
monetary expansion direction
monetary.monetary_expansion_direction
Direction of monetary-base expansion decisions relative to trend. Separate from fiscal.transfer_expansion even when correlated.
increased · moderate · unintended
expansionary (balance sheet, rates lower than Taylor)
Repeated dinar devaluations translated into accelerating inflation.

Enacted by

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Truss 2022 mini-budget shows that unfunded fiscal expansion above the ZLB triggers sharp bond-market and currency responses through expected-inflation and risk-premium channels.
unfunded_fiscal_expansion_above_zlb_bond_market_responseinferred
viafiscal.spending_levelmonetary.monetary_expansion_direction
SUPPORTED — GBP/USD trough on 2022-09-26 (1.0703) was 5.02% below the 2022-09-22 pre-announcement close (1.1269); log-decline +0.0515 clears the 3.0% threshold …
supported
Across the 2008-2014 ZLB era and the 2020-2021 pandemic-response window, large-scale de-facto monetary finance of fiscal expansion in the US, Japan, and the Eurozone did not produce headline-CPI inflation consistent with naive quantity-theoretic monetisation predictions: cumulative central-bank balance-sheet expansion exceeded 15% of GDP while CPI YoY remained below 3% in each economy across both windows.
monetary_finance_zlb_no_inflationinferred
viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level
REFUTED — CPI threshold breach: USA zlb_2008_2014 peak 3.81% in 2008; USA covid_2020_2021 peak 4.68% in 2021; Eurozone CPI not loaded
refuted
The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.
soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred
viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']
run pending
Fiscal multipliers are state-dependent: large at ZLB, small near full employment; no single-number answer is policy-relevant.
fiscal_multipliers_state_dependentinferred
viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level
REFUTED — sign - OPPOSITE claim +, cumulative_effect=-1.569, h=5, p_h=0.0155
refuted
Post-2008 large-scale asset purchase programmes by the Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan produced a measurable divergence between asset-price inflation (equities and residential real estate) and headline consumer-price inflation until roughly 2021.
qe_asset_inflation_vs_cpi_divergence_post_2008inferred
viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level
refuted — Only 2 of 8 countries had even a 0.10 log-point asset-vs-CPI gap by 2020 (mean GAP_2020 = -0.02). The post-2008 divergence story does not survive a pa…
refuted
Across OECD economies 1995-2021, the cumulative fiscal multiplier on real output at the zero lower bound (defined as quarters with policy rate ≤ 0.50% AND inflation expectations anchored below 2.5%) exceeds 1.2 at horizon h=8 quarters, while the comparable normal-regime multiplier is below 0.7.
zlb_state_dependent_multiplier_pk_framinginferred
viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:NAQ_government_consumption', 'manual: Ramey-Zubairy military news shocks; Guajardo-Lei…
run pending
Post-2008 quantitative easing operated principally through a Minsky-style financialisation channel — collateral-revaluation, portfolio-rebalancing into long-duration risk assets, and a yield-driven compression of risk premia — rather than through the textbook quantity-theoretic broad-money or expectations channels.
qe_financialisation_minsky_channel_2008_2021inferred
viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level
INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient observations after listwise deletion (14)
run pending
Abenomics' combined monetary-fiscal expansion lifted Japanese inflation and output partially but failed to durably escape the deflation equilibrium, consistent with NK models of near-permanent ZLB traps.
abenomics_monetary_fiscal_coordination_effectinferred
viamonetary.monetary_expansion_directionfiscal.spending_level
SUPPORTED — shape=ITS, sign matches claim +, mean_gap=+6.836, z=+17
supported

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

Greece Simitis stabilisation programme (1985-1987)
GRC·1985
match
1.4
spending levelmonetary expansion direction
Ingreso Familiar de Emergencia (IFE) COVID transfer (2020)
ARG·2020
match
1.3
spending levelmonetary expansion direction
IMF Stand-By Arrangement (Jun 2018, expanded Sep 2018)
ARG·2018
match
1.3
spending levelmonetary expansion direction
Milei Shock Therapy — Argentina December 2023 onward
ARG·2023
match
1.3
spending levelmonetary expansion direction
Four-Trillion-Yuan Stimulus (四万亿) 2008-2010
CHN·2008
match
1.3
spending levelmonetary expansion direction
Greece Convergence Programme 1994-1999
GRC·1994
match
1.3
spending levelmonetary expansion direction
Israeli Economic Stabilization Plan (July 1985)
ISR·1985
match
1.3
spending levelmonetary expansion direction
Iran Fifth Development Plan doubling 1974-78
IRN·1974
match
1.3
spending levelmonetary expansion direction

References