De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Direction of monetary-base expansion decisions relative to trend. Separate from fiscal.transfer_expansion even when correlated.
FOMC under Chair Paul Volcker shifted operating procedure to non-borrowed reserves targeting (effectively money-supply targeting briefly). Fed funds rate peaked near 20% mid-1981. CPI inflation peaked at 14.8% (March 1980) and fell to ~3% by 1983. Induced the 1980 and 1981-82 recessions (peak-trough unemployment 10.8% late 1982). Demonstrated — per refinement D.1.5 — that 'well-managed fiat with central bank independence can restore price stability without a gold standard'. Cornerstone empirical case for inflation- targeting central banking. Political cost was substantial; Reagan supported Volcker publicly, insulating him.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.