Rule of law as institutional substrate — contract enforcement, judicial independence, equal treatment before the law. Upstream of most other axes.
Independence of the judiciary from executive and legislative encroachment. Specifically captures court-packing, selective prosecution, judicial reshuffles.
South Sudan's transitional parties extended the R-ARCSS transition by two years in 2024 and postponed the planned national elections to December 2026. The extension was justified by incomplete security arrangements, constitution-making, census, and election preparations, but it also kept the unelected unity government in office and delayed the first post-independence national election.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.
The coding recognizes logistical constraints cited by the parties but scores the institutional effect of delaying elections.