Singapore MAS and Asian-dollar financial hub strategy, 1971-1990

Singapore's LKY-era market-rule and financial-hub trajectory produced deep private credit, large FDI intensity, and high market-rule scores by the modern endpoint, consistent with an open financial-services hub rather than a closed developmental state.

Major episodes of financial deregulation — the 1999 US Gramm-Leach- Bliley repeal of Glass-Steagall, the 1986 UK Financial Services Act ("Big Bang"), Chile's 1974-1981 banking liberalisation, Sweden's late-1980s credit-market liberalisation, and Japan's 1996-2001 Big Bang — are followed within 10 years by higher-than-baseline incidence of banking crises, measured by the Laeven-Valencia Systemic Banking Crisis Database, and by elevated credit-to-GDP gaps per BIS.

Liberal democracies experience monotonic positional drift toward larger, more redistributive states across multi-decade horizons.

Truss 2022 mini-budget shows that unfunded fiscal expansion above the ZLB triggers sharp bond-market and currency responses through expected-inflation and risk-premium channels.

UK Truss mini-budget 2022 gilt crisis reflected market confidence and institutional-framework rupture rather than an MMT-predicted hard fiscal limit, because the BoE restored order by intervening as issuer.

Argentina's 2001-2002 crisis — convertibility regime collapse, December 2001 corralito freeze on bank deposits, January 2002 currency-board abandonment, sovereign default, pesification of bank balance sheets, and real-GDP contraction of >= 10% peak-to-trough — is the canonical case of a hard-peg / currency-board collapse compounded by banking-system suspension.

The 2007-2009 global financial crisis originated in household-debt-financed consumption sustaining aggregate demand despite stagnant real wages, a Minsky-plus-Marx pattern.

In an OECD panel 2000-2023, increases in OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) stringency and increases in regulatory uncertainty (proxied by year-to-year changes in the OECD PMR sub-indices) are negatively associated with private non-residential investment as a share of GDP, with effects concentrated in capital-intensive long-duration sectors.

Argentine quarterly real GDP, having contracted in 2024H1 under the Milei stabilisation shock, recovers along a trajectory that by Q4 2025 closes at least 50% of the peak-to-trough output gap observed during the shock's worst quarter, and by Q4 2026 returns to or exceeds the pre-Milei (Q4 2023) real-GDP level.