Policies·ru_national_priority_projects_2005

National Priority Projects 2005

RUS·2005 – ·enacted 2005-09-05·Putin presidency, Fradkov governmentcandidate

What the policy did

Launched by Putin 5 September 2005: four priority projects in Health, Education, Housing, and Agriculture, overseen by First Deputy PM Dmitry Medvedev (the role used to elevate him as Putin's eventual successor). Large earmarked funding pools out of oil-boom revenues.

Policy-content fingerprint — what this policy moved, on which axes

Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.

intended

↑

sectoral subsidy

fiscal.sectoral_subsidy

Targeted industrial and sectoral subsidies (renewable energy, chip manufacturing, agriculture, green hydrogen, etc).

increased · strong

expanded sectoral subsidies

Large earmarked cross-sector subsidy programmes.

↑

spending level

fiscal.spending_level

General government spending as share of GDP, excluding transfers already captured under fiscal.transfer_expansion to avoid double-counting.

increased · moderate

higher spending share

Oil-revenue-funded discretionary expansion.

Enacted by

russia_putin_second_term_2004_2008

Empirical evidence — linked hypotheses

Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".

Large welfare states sustain long-run real GDP per capita growth when paired with market flexibility (low product- and labour-market barriers), trade openness, and fiscal discipline (debt-to-GDP below 90%), but not when paired with rigid product and labour markets, in an OECD and rich- country panel 1980-2020.

welfare_state_market_flexibility_complementinferred

viafiscal.spending_level

PARTIAL — coef=+3.308e-18, p=0.653; effect magnitude effectively zero

partial

Truss 2022 mini-budget shows that unfunded fiscal expansion above the ZLB triggers sharp bond-market and currency responses through expected-inflation and risk-premium channels.

unfunded_fiscal_expansion_above_zlb_bond_market_responseinferred

viafiscal.spending_level

SUPPORTED — GBP/USD trough on 2022-09-26 (1.0703) was 5.02% below the 2022-09-22 pre-announcement close (1.1269); log-decline +0.0515 clears the 3.0% threshold …

supported

Fiscal multipliers are state-dependent: large at ZLB, small near full employment; no single-number answer is policy-relevant.

fiscal_multipliers_state_dependentinferred

viafiscal.spending_level

REFUTED — sign - OPPOSITE claim +, cumulative_effect=-1.569, h=5, p_h=0.0155

refuted

The Soviet central-planning system, having already exhibited TFP stagnation 1970-1989, underwent a canonical institutional and economic collapse 1989-1998 as plan-enforcement was withdrawn without functioning market institutions in place.

soviet_union_central_planning_gdp_collapse_1989_1991inferred

viafiscal.spending_level

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no outcome variable loaded; missing: ['derived: count of canonical_metrics with threshold met']

run pending

UK Truss mini-budget 2022 gilt crisis reflected market confidence and institutional-framework rupture rather than an MMT-predicted hard fiscal limit, because the BoE restored order by intervening as issuer.

uk_truss_mini_budget_currency_sovereign_mechanisminferred

viafiscal.spending_level

partial — Both mechanism legs are directionally consistent but at least one fails the SUPPORTED threshold: FX leg holds (5.02% trough decline); yield leg partia…

partial

UK GDP per capita (PPP, constant international dollars) diverged negatively from a matched synthetic counterfactual of similar-income anglophone/developed economies (USA, CAN, AUS, NZL, DEU, NLD, CHE) starting around 2008 and widening post-2016 (Brexit referendum).

uk_economic_decline_multi_movementinferred

viafiscal.spending_level

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — treatment 'uk_post_2008' has no within-country variation under country fixed effects

run pending

The 2022-2026 wave of major-economy industrial-policy programmes — US IRA + CHIPS, EU Critical Raw Materials Act + Net-Zero Industry Act, EU Chips Act, Japan Green Transformation (GX, ¥150tn / ~$1tn announced), Korea K-Chips + Korean New Deal 2.0, China 14th Five-Year Plan + Made-in-China-2025-2.0 with semiconductors and clean energy as national-security frontier — represents the largest coordinated wave of industrial-policy spending in the post-1970s OECD record.

green_industrial_policy_global_chip_race_2022_2026inferred

viafiscal.sectoral_subsidy

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — insufficient observations after listwise deletion (20)

run pending

Biden's IRA/CHIPS industrial policy will show partial success on capacity-building metrics and mixed results on job creation, consistent with the conditional view that industrial policy works where targeting is technically competent and governance is strong.

industrial_policy_semiconductor_chips_act_effectivenessinferred

viafiscal.sectoral_subsidy

inconclusive — Stacked: (4/4) spec-named semi-specific series unavailable on disk (oecd:STAN_INDUSTRY ISIC C26, bls:CES3133, ilostat:semiconductor employment, c…

run pending

Similar historical policies

Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.

II Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento (Brazil, 1974-1979)

BRA·1974

match

1.9

sectoral subsidyspending level

Industrialising industries strategy

DZA·1967

match

1.9

spending levelsectoral subsidy

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam launch

ETH·2011