De jure and de facto independence of the central bank from fiscal authority. Per D.1.5 scope, one of the framework's defensible monetary positions.
Financial-sector regulation — banking separation, capital requirements, cross-border activity rules, derivatives oversight.
Product-market regulation, entry barriers, licensing burdens, network-industry regulation, price controls.
Size of cash and near-cash transfer programmes (unemployment benefits, means-tested assistance, universal child benefits). Architecturally distinct from forced-saving schemes — see condition welfare_architecture.
Law No. 23/1999 on Bank Indonesia made the central bank legally independent of government, gave it sole responsibility for monetary stability, and prohibited direct deficit financing. Enacted in the immediate post-Suharto Reformasi period as part of IMF-programme conditionality, the law underpinned the subsequent move to inflation targeting (formally adopted in 2005) and remains the foundational monetary-institutional reform of the post-1998 era.
Per invariant 3, reforms are scored by what they did on each channel-separated axis, not by the party that enacted them. This fingerprint is how the policy-match engine finds historical analogues.
Explicit links are curated by the author. Inferred links are hypotheses in the library that test the same axes this policy moved — the framework's answer to "what does the data say about a policy like this?".
Ranked by axis-fingerprint overlap with this policy. Direction match bolded — those are the closest historical analogues. Shape of the match is what drives policy-outcome comparison, not the country or party label.