Correa II consolidated statist-developmentalism against a worsening terms-of-trade backdrop. (a) Economic school: Bolivarian developmentalism under dollarization strain — continued Chinese oil-backed lending (total ~USD 15bn to 2017 from CDB + Eximbank), Ley Orgánica de Comunicación Jun 2013 media regulation, 2014 Código Orgánico Monetario y Financiero (Sep 2014) reorganising BCE + deposit-insurance + liquidity regimes, 2015 electronic-money-on-BCE-platform (failed rollout), EU-Andean Community FTA signed Nov 2016 entered into force Jan 2017 (pragmatic trade pivot), 2016 Manabí earthquake (16 Apr 2016, 7.8 Mw) reconstruction. (b) Left-right: left; modest pragmatic reopening late-term (EU FTA, IMF flirtation post-earthquake). (c) Dated policies: Communications Law Jun 2013, Monetary-Financial Code Sep 2014, April 2016 earthquake (673 deaths, USD 3bn damage, solidarity-tax VAT +2pp to 14%, fiscal contributions), EU FTA Nov 2016, constitutional amendment to allow indefinite re-election Dec 2015 (later abandoned via 2018 referendum). (d) Popularity: re-elected Feb 2013 57.2% first round; approval slid from ~80% early-term to ~40% by late 2016 on oil-price crash, earthquake, corruption perceptions; did not seek immediate re-election (allowed Moreno to succeed). (e) Coherence: moderate — macro model strained when oil price halved 2014-2016, dollarization limited monetary response, pushed government to Chinese lending + post-quake solidarity tax; Odebrecht + Petroecuador corruption scandals surfaced post-term.
Policy-content fingerprint — how the framework codes this movement on its axes