Pre-registration
Mercosur (Treaty of Asunción 1991, customs union effective 1995) raised intra-bloc trade-openness for ARG, BRA, PRY, URY through the 1990s but produced minimal additional trade-creation effects after Argentina's 2001 crisis and the gradual erosion of the common external tariff. The descriptive claim is that the bloc's trade effect peaked in the late 1990s and has since stagnated relative to non-Mercosur Latin American economies.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
SUPPORTED if (a) Mercosur trade-openness rose by >=10 pp from 1990 to 1998 relative to non-Mercosur Latin American comparators, AND (b) the 1998-2019 change is <= +5 pp relative to comparators (post-peak stagnation). REFUTED if 1998-2019 change exceeds comparators by more than 10 pp (which would indicate continued trade-creation, contrary to the descriptive claim).
formal test & threshold
test: descriptive_mercosur_pre_post_1998_peak threshold: PRIMARY: openness_change(1990->1998) > +10 pp vs comparators AND openness_change(1998->2019) <= +5 pp vs comparators.
Method
- Template
descriptive- Clustering
none- Sample
- 9 countries · 1985 – 2019
- Evidence type
- descriptive
Descriptive comparison of trade-openness trajectories: Mercosur members vs Latin American non-members. Reports trade-openness levels at 1990, 1998 (pre-Argentina crisis peak), 2008, 2019. The substantive question is whether the post-2001 stagnation pattern holds.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
trade_openness_pct_gdp outcome | world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZStier 2 | level |
merchandise_exports_pct_gdp outcome | world_bank_wdi:NE.EXP.GNFS.ZStier 2 | level |
mercosur_indicator treatment | constructed:indicator = 1 for ARG, BRA, PRY, URY from 1995 (customs union effective)tier 5 | indicator |
log_gdp_pc_pretreatment control | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2 | log_level_at_treatment_minus_1 |
real_effective_exchange_rate control | imf:REERtier 2 | log |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — trade_lib_mercosur_1991_intra_bloc_trade
Verdict: REFUTED — shape=panel_summary, sign - OPPOSITE claim +; |Δ_log|=0.577, ratio=0.562
Pre-registration
- Claim: Mercosur (Treaty of Asunción 1991, customs union effective 1995) raised intra-bloc trade-openness for ARG, BRA, PRY, URY through the 1990s but produced minimal additional trade-creation effects after Argentina's 2001 crisis and the gradual erosion of the common external tariff. The descriptive claim is that the bloc's trade effect peaked in the late 1990s and has since stagnated relative to non-Mercosur Latin American economies.
- Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if (a) Mercosur trade-openness rose by >=10 pp from 1990 to 1998 relative to non-Mercosur Latin American comparators, AND (b) the 1998-2019 change is <= +5 pp relative to comparators (post-peak stagnation). REFUTED if 1998-2019 change exceeds comparators by more than 10 pp (which would indicate continued trade-creation, contrary to the descriptive claim).
- Falsification test: descriptive_mercosur_pre_post_1998_peak
Comparison
- shape: panel_summary
- treatment_country: ARG
- treatment_value: 28.648994495882096
- donor_pool_median: 51.003876654043346
- ratio: 0.5617022935375431
- log_diff: -0.5767832962447814
- n_donor_countries: 8
- end_year_window: [2014, 2019]
Variables resolved
world_bank_wdi:NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS→ trade_openness_pct_gdp (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10779)world_bank_wdi:NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS→ merchandise_exports_pct_gdp (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=10969)world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD→ log_gdp_pc_pretreatment (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=14131)
Variables missing data
constructed: indicator = 1 for ARG, BRA, PRY, URY from 1995 (customs union effective)(treatment, name=mercosur_indicator)imf:REER(controls, name=real_effective_exchange_rate)
Generated by scripts/run_descriptive.py at 2026-04-30T08:07:40+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.