Pre-registration
Western sanctions on Russia 2022-2025 produced material but bounded economic damage — GDP contraction shallower than Western forecasters predicted in March 2022 — because oil-revenue rerouting (China + India + Turkey absorption of seaborne crude under the G7 price cap) and import-substitution from EAEU partners blunted the trade-shock impact, while the ruble stabilised after initial collapse via capital controls and a current-account surplus. The effective sanctions impact was real but smaller than the "isolation" rhetoric suggested, with binding effects concentrated in technology imports and long-run capital deepening.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
Multi-metric checklist on Russia 2022-Q1 to 2025-Q1. SUPPORTED if >=4 of 6 metrics meet thresholds; REFUTED if <=2 do. Each metric independently sourced (Rosstat shadow estimates / IMF / CBR / customs data / Yale CELI tracker / FRED) capturing different channels: GDP shortfall vs forecast, oil-revenue rerouting, ruble path, trade re-routing, technology-import collapse, fiscal-buffer drawdown.
formal test & threshold
test: russia_sanctions_2022_2025_multi_metric threshold: >=4/6 supports; <=2/6 refutes
Method
- Template
multi_metric_checklist- Clustering
none- Sample
- 1 countries · 2018 – 2025
- Evidence type
- canonical_case_multi_metric
Single-country canonical case. Cross-source measurement essential given Rosstat reporting concerns post-2022. Multi-metric design captures channel decomposition (GDP, trade rerouting, FX, tech, fiscal buffer, third-country intermediation) rather than single coefficient.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
real_gdp_growth_yoy outcome | imf:NGDP_RPCHtier 2 world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2 | pct_change_yoy |
rub_usd_exchange_rate outcome | fred:DEXRUUStier 1 | log |
cpi_inflation outcome | world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2 | pct_change_yoy |
cbr_policy_rate outcome | cbr:key_ratetier 3 | level |
trade_partner_shares outcome | world_bank_wdi:TX.VAL.MRCH.HI.ZStier 2 | level_pct |
g7_sanctions_indicator treatment | constructed:1 from 2022-02-24 onward; oil price cap from 2022-12-05tier 5 | indicator |
oil_export_destination_china_india treatment | owid:russian_oil_exports_destinationtier 2 | level_pct |
oil_price_brent control | imf_pcps:POILBREtier 1 | log |
oil_price_urals_discount control | owid:urals_brent_spreadtier 2 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — russia_sanctions_2022_2025_economic_response_decomposition
Verdict: inconclusive (data gaps)
Reason: 0 metrics met, 5 pending; 4 more need resolution
Pre-registered rule: SUPPORT if >= 4 of 6 metrics met; REFUTE if <= 2 met (impossible to hit support).
Counts: 0 MET · 1 NOT_MET · 4 PENDING_DATA · 1 PENDING_EVAL
Primary country: RUS
Metric-by-metric
| # | Metric | Status | Observed | Threshold | Notes |
|---|---|:---:|---:|---|---|
| 1 | gdp_shortfall_vs_march2022_forecast | PENDING_EVAL | | actual cumulative 2022-2024 GDP within +/- 4pp of MARCH-2022 IMF projection (i.e., damage materialised meaningfully but bounded) | cross-country gap/ratio requires dedicated cross-country evaluator; data present |
| 2 | oil_revenue_rerouting_china_india_share | PENDING_DATA | | >=70% of seaborne crude exports to CHN+IND by 2024 (vs ~30% in 2021) | No usable vintage for: owid:russian_oil_exports_destination |
| 3 | ruble_stabilisation_post_initial_collapse | PENDING_DATA | | RUB/USD by 2024-Q4 within 30% of 2021 baseline (i.e., partial recovery from 2022-03 trough but not full retracement) | No usable vintage for: fred:DEXRUUS |
| 4 | technology_import_collapse | PENDING_DATA | | >=50% decline in tech-imports from G7 by 2024 vs 2021 | No RUS observations in loaded vintages |
| 5 | fiscal_buffer_nwf_drawdown | PENDING_DATA | | >40% decline in liquid NWF assets over the window | No usable vintage for: cbr:nwf_liquid_assets |
| 6 | third_country_intermediation_turkey_uae | NOT_MET | 0 (2022) [pct_increase_from_baseline] | >=50% cumulative trade increase with TUR+ARE+KAZ combined 2022-2024 vs 2021 baseline | |
Claim
Western sanctions on Russia 2022-2025 produced material but bounded economic damage — GDP contraction shallower than Western forecasters predicted in March 2022 — because oil-revenue rerouting (China + India + Turkey absorption of seaborne crude under the G7 price cap) and import-substitution from EAEU partners blunted the trade-shock impact, while the ruble stabilised after initial collapse via capital controls and a current-account surplus. The effective sanctions impact was real but smaller than the "isolation" rhetoric suggested, with binding effects concentrated in technology imports and long-run capital deepening.
Interpretation
Verdict is inconclusive (data gaps) — 4 metric(s) cannot be evaluated because the underlying data source is not yet in the vintages pipeline, and 1 metric(s) have data but a threshold expression the auto-evaluator does not recognise (complex conditions, discrete event counts, cross-country gaps). Close these gaps then re-run.
Steelman live concerns
See hypotheses/steelman/russia_sanctions_2022_2025_economic_response_decomposition.md for the strongest opposing arguments. Canonical-case multi-metric evidence is a pattern match, not a causal identification — the result card should be read as 'outcome trajectory matches the predicted pattern to degree X' rather than 'policy P caused the outcome'.
Provenance
Vintages pinned in manifest.yaml. Full per-metric diagnostics in diagnostics.json. Machine-readable results in metric_results.parquet.
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.
Notes
Multi-metric decomposition of a major 2020s natural experiment in large-economy sanctions. Tests the gap between predicted and realised damage; pattern-match across GDP, ruble, oil-revenue, trade-rerouting.