IESET.
Hypotheses·labour·labour_reform_poland_2017_retirement_age_reversal

Poland's 2017 retirement-age reversal (PiS-government rollback of the 2012 Tusk-government age increase: women's age 60 from 67, men's age 65 from 67) reduced the 55-64 employment-rate by at least 3 pp by 2020 relative to a synthetic control of Visegrad-Central-European peers, and increased the early pension take-up rate substantially.

PARTIALengine/runs/labour_reform_poland_2017_retirement_age_reversal

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.1204, |gap|/pre_sd=0.058, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether poland retirement age reversal is actually linked to better or worse employment rate 55 64 from 2010 to 2022.

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. mean_gap=-0.1204, |gap|/pre_sd=0.058, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

why it matters

Labor-market rules often help some workers while risking job loss or slower hiring for others. This test looks for that tradeoff in observable employment or unemployment data.

how the test works

It compares 8 country or place units from 2010 to 2022, using a synth did design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Poland retirement age reversal
What we checked
  • Employment rate 55 64
  • Early pension take up rate
  • Labour force participation 55 64
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

5 input datasets, 1 unresolved missing series, provenance status: incomplete.

Results

engine/runs/labour_reform_poland_2017_retirement_age_reversal
1007550250201020162022POLCZESVKHUNROUBGRSVN
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show employment_rate_55_64 across 8 sampled countries over 2010–2022.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for labour_reform_poland_2017_retirement_age_reversal. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/labour_reform_poland_2017_retirement_age_reversal/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 098ce96 · 2026-04-30T12:57:33Z
run generated · 2026-05-15T19:53:17Z

Poland's 2017 retirement-age reversal (PiS-government rollback of the 2012 Tusk-government age increase: women's age 60 from 67, men's age 65 from 67) reduced the 55-64 employment-rate by at least 3 pp by 2020 relative to a synthetic control of Visegrad-Central-European peers, and increased the early pension take-up rate substantially.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

SUPPORTED if synth-DiD gap on Polish 55-64 employment rate < -3.0 pp by 2020 AND early pension take-up rises by > +5 pp relative to donor pool. REFUTED if employment-rate gap is < -1.0 pp OR if the gap is concentrated in non- pension-eligible age groups (suggesting non-pension confound).

formal test & threshold
test:      Synth-DiD on Polish 55-64 employment rate 2017-2020 vs Visegrad-CEE donor pool, placebo permutation at p<0.10.

Method

Template
synth_did
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
8 countries · 2010 – 2022
Evidence type
associational

Data

VariableSourceTransform
employment_rate_55_64
outcome
oecd:DSD_LFStier 2
level
early_pension_take_up_rate
outcome
eurostat:demo_pjantier 1
level
labour_force_participation_55_64
outcome
oecd:DSD_LFStier 2
level
poland_retirement_age_reversal
treatment
constructed:indicator for 2017-10 retirement-age rollback effective datetier 5
indicator
gdp_per_capita_real
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
ecb_policy_rate
control
ecb:FMtier 1
level
working_age_population_share
control
world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.1564.TO.ZStier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — labour_reform_poland_2017_retirement_age_reversal

Verdict: PARTIAL — mean_gap=-0.1204, |gap|/pre_sd=0.058, p_perm=1 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Poland's 2017 retirement-age reversal (PiS-government rollback of the 2012 Tusk-government age increase: women's age 60 from 67, men's age 65 from 67) reduced the 55-64 employment-rate by at least 3 pp by 2020 relative to a synthetic control of Visegrad-Central-European peers, and increased the early pension take-up rate substantially.
  • Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if synth-DiD gap on Polish 55-64 employment rate < -3.0 pp by 2020 AND early pension take-up rises by > +5 pp relative to donor pool. REFUTED if employment-rate gap is < -1.0 pp OR if the gap is concentrated in non- pension-eligible age groups (suggesting non-pension confound).

Synthetic-control estimate

  • shape: synth_did
  • treated_country: POL
  • event_year: 2017
  • n_donors: 7
  • donor_weights (top): {'SVK': 0.41, 'ROU': 0.2103, 'HUN': 0.1814, 'SVN': 0.1139, 'EST': 0.0466}
  • pre_rmse: 0.9802971840459644
  • pre_period_sd: 2.0914783220078013
  • mean_post_gap: -0.12039886143346716
  • end_period_gap: 0.7250188656714869
  • post_period_years: [2017, 2022]
  • placebo_p_value: 1.0
  • n_placebos: 7
  • method: synthetic-control via NNLS, permutation inference

Variables resolved

  • oecd:DSD_LFS@DF_LFS_INDIC → employment_rate_55_64 (outcome, n=2255)
  • eurostat:demo_pjan → early_pension_take_up_rate (outcome, n=3029)
  • oecd:DSD_LFS@DF_LFS_INDIC → labour_force_participation_55_64 (outcome, n=2255)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → gdp_per_capita_real (controls, n=14066)
  • ecb:FM → ecb_policy_rate (controls, n=264)
  • world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS → working_age_population_share (controls, n=16965)

Generated by scripts/run_synth_did.py at 2026-05-15T19:53:17+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Treatment dated 2017-Q4 (effective 2017-10-01). Poland is the canonical case of an explicit retirement-age reversal in the EU and a clean test of the labour-supply channel. Donor pool excludes other CEE countries that ran their own retirement-age changes in the window.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.