Pre-registration
The Bank of England's operational independence (May 1997, instrument-independence on monetary policy) and its post-GFC macroprudential remit (Financial Policy Committee created April 2013 under the Bank of England Act 2013) are associated with (a) lower realised UK CPI-inflation volatility 1997-2008 vs 1985-1997, (b) flatter UK credit-cycle amplitude 2014-2022 vs 2000-2007, and (c) lower exchange- rate-passthrough volatility post-1997 vs pre-1997. The hypothesis is tested as a pre/post comparison on three pre-registered metrics; supports if 2 of 3 metrics show statistically significant improvement.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
SUPPORTED if 2 of 3 metrics show post-period values lower than pre-period values by at least 25% in magnitude, with t-test p < 0.10. PARTIAL if 1 of 3 meets criterion. REFUTED if 0 of 3 meets criterion or any metric shows post-period values higher by >= 25%.
formal test & threshold
test: pre_post_comparison_three_metrics threshold: >=2 of 3 metrics with post < pre by 25% at p<0.10
Method
- Template
descriptive- Sample
- 1 countries · 1985 – 2024
- Evidence type
- associational
Pre/post comparison on three metrics: CPI volatility (5y rolling std) 1985-1996 vs 1998-2008; credit-cycle amplitude (5y rolling std of credit-growth) 2000-2007 vs 2014-2022; and ER-passthrough coefficient pre-1997 vs post-1997. Robustness: rolling-window estimation; structural-break tests at 1997 and 2013.
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
cpi_inflation_volatility outcome | boe:CPI_UKtier 1 world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZGtier 2 | rolling_std_yoy_5y |
household_credit_growth_volatility outcome | boe:LPMAUYMtier 1 world_bank_wdi:FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZStier 2 | rolling_std_yoy_5y |
gbp_eer_passthrough_to_cpi outcome | boe:XUDLBK67tier 1 bis:WS_EERtier 2 | regression_coef_xr_to_cpi |
boe_independence_1997 treatment | constructed:1997-05-06 Bank of England operational-independence datetier 5 | event_date |
fpc_macroprudential_2013 treatment | constructed:2013-04-01 Financial Policy Committee statutory creationtier 5 | event_date |
real_gdp_growth control | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2 | yoy_pct |
bank_of_england_policy_rate control | boe:IUDBEDRtier 1 fred:BOERUKMtier 1 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — financial_boe_independence_1997_macroprudential_2013
Verdict: SUPPORTED — shape=pre_post, sign matches claim -, |Δ_log|=1.09
Pre-registration
- Claim: The Bank of England's operational independence (May 1997, instrument-independence on monetary policy) and its post-GFC macroprudential remit (Financial Policy Committee created April 2013 under the Bank of England Act 2013) are associated with (a) lower realised UK CPI-inflation volatility 1997-2008 vs 1985-1997, (b) flatter UK credit-cycle amplitude 2014-2022 vs 2000-2007, and (c) lower exchange- rate-passthrough volatility post-1997 vs pre-1997. The hypothesis is tested as a pre/post comparison on three pre-registered metrics; supports if 2 of 3 metrics show statistically significant improvement.
- Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if 2 of 3 metrics show post-period values lower than pre-period values by at least 25% in magnitude, with t-test p < 0.10. PARTIAL if 1 of 3 meets criterion. REFUTED if 0 of 3 meets criterion or any metric shows post-period values higher by >= 25%.
- Falsification test: pre_post_comparison_three_metrics
Comparison
- shape: pre_post
- country: GBR
- cut_year: 1997
- pre_mean: 7.126755797276248
- post_mean: 2.4041843473052333
- delta: -4.7225714499710145
- log_delta: -1.0866454261801384
- n_pre: 37
- n_post: 28
Variables resolved
boe:CPI_UK; world_bank_wdi:FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG→ cpi_inflation_volatility (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=9066)boe:LPMAUYM; bis:WS_TC→ household_credit_growth_volatility (outcome, publisher=boe, n=45)boe:XUDLBK67; bis:WS_EER→ gbp_eer_passthrough_to_cpi (outcome, publisher=bis, n=2922)world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG→ real_gdp_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13961)boe:IUDBEDR; fred:BOERUKM→ bank_of_england_policy_rate (controls, publisher=boe, n=52)
Variables missing data
constructed: 1997-05-06 Bank of England operational-independence date(treatment, name=boe_independence_1997)constructed: 2013-04-01 Financial Policy Committee statutory creation(treatment, name=fpc_macroprudential_2013)
Generated by scripts/run_descriptive.py at 2026-04-30T08:07:39+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.