Pre-registration
Across OECD countries 1990-2023, the rise in the old-age dependency ratio is associated with a proportional increase in public pension expenditure as a share of GDP and crowding-out of productive public investment, particularly where pay-as-you-go pension architecture predominates. The hypothesis predicts a positive elasticity of pension spending to old-age dependency exceeding 0.7, and a negative association between rising pension shares and public capital investment.
Falsification criterion — what would disprove this
This hypothesis is considered falsified if:
SUPPORTED if elasticity of pension share to old-age dependency >= 0.7 with p<0.05, AND public investment share negatively associated with pension share at p<0.10. REFUTED if elasticity below 0.4 or wrong-signed, OR no crowd-out detectable in either direction.
formal test & threshold
test: panel_fe_pension_dependency_elasticity_with_crowdout threshold: elasticity_pension_to_oadr >= 0.7 AND coef_pension_on_invest < 0 AND p < 0.10
Method
- Template
panel_fe- Fixed effects
country, year- Clustering
country- Sample
- 30 countries · 1990 – 2023
- Evidence type
- associational
Data
| Variable | Source | Transform |
|---|---|---|
public_pension_expenditure_share_gdp outcome | oecd:OECD.ELS.SAEtier 2 | level |
public_investment_share_gdp outcome | imf:WEO.NGDP_RPCHtier 2 | level |
old_age_dependency_ratio treatment | world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.DPND.OLtier 2 | level |
gdp_per_capita_ppp control | world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KDtier 2 | log |
government_effectiveness control | wgi:GOV_WGI_GE.ESTtier 4 | level |
● ready · ● pending · ● reconstruct-needed
Detailed result card
Result card — demo_ageing_pension_burden_cross_country
Verdict: PARTIAL — coef=+0.09129, p=0.172 (above α=0.05); direction inconclusive
Pre-registration
- Claim: Across OECD countries 1990-2023, the rise in the old-age dependency ratio is associated with a proportional increase in public pension expenditure as a share of GDP and crowding-out of productive public investment, particularly where pay-as-you-go pension architecture predominates. The hypothesis predicts a positive elasticity of pension spending to old-age dependency exceeding 0.7, and a negative association between rising pension shares and public capital investment.
- Falsification rule: SUPPORTED if elasticity of pension share to old-age dependency >= 0.7 with p<0.05, AND public investment share negatively associated with pension share at p<0.10. REFUTED if elasticity below 0.4 or wrong-signed, OR no crowd-out detectable in either direction.
- Falsification test: panel_fe_pension_dependency_elasticity_with_crowdout
Estimate
- Method: linearmodels.PanelOLS
- Coefficient (treatment): +0.09129
- Std error: 0.06676
- p-value: 0.172
- Observations: 695, countries: 30
- Within R²: 0.0644
- Fixed effects: entity=True, time=True
- Clustering: country
Variables resolved
oecd:OECD.ELS.SAE,DSD_SOCX_AGG@DF_SOCX_AGG,1.0→ public_pension_expenditure_share_gdp (outcome, publisher=oecd, n=1481)imf:WEO.NGDP_RPCH→ public_investment_share_gdp (outcome, publisher=imf, n=10914)world_bank_wdi:SP.POP.DPND.OL→ old_age_dependency_ratio (treatment, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=16935)world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD→ gdp_per_capita_ppp (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8325)wgi:GOV_WGI_GE.EST→ government_effectiveness (controls, publisher=wgi, n=5168)
Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:54:47+00:00
Strongest opposing argument
Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.
Notes
SOCX OECD path data-gated; IMF GFCF series resolved at wiring.