IESET.
Hypotheses·growth·bolivia_morales_resource_nationalism_2006_2019

Bolivia's 2006-2019 Morales-MAS era (May 2006 hydrocarbons nationalisation, renegotiated gas-export contracts with Brazil and Argentina, expansion of cash-transfer programmes Bono Juancito Pinto and Renta Dignidad, fixed-currency-peg-style stabilisation, large social investment) produced a measurable poverty-reduction and growth record relative to a Latin American resource-dependent peer pool.

The pre-registered claim is (a) cumulative log real-GDP per capita 2006-2019 is at or above the LATAM median, AND (b) extreme- poverty headcount falls by at least 15 percentage points 2005-2019, AND (c) public-investment share of GDP rises at least 4 percentage points relative to peer median. The mechanism is that resource-rent capture combined with currency stability and fiscal-discipline features produced a rare macroeconomically stable redistribution.

PARTIALengine/runs/bolivia_morales_resource_nationalism_2006_2019

PARTIAL — mean_gap=-1.048, |gap|/pre_sd=25, p_perm=0.25 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

confidence cueThe result is useful, but not decisive. Treat it as a clue, not a settled conclusion.

policy briefMixed or noisy

In ordinary language

Over a long period, do more market-oriented institutions translate into higher income or productivity, once the comparison looks beyond a single success story?

plain answer

The evidence is suggestive but not decisive. mean_gap=-1.048, |gap|/pre_sd=25, p_perm=0.25 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

why it matters

Growth claims can look convincing in single success stories. This test asks whether the pattern survives a broader comparison.

how the test works

It compares 8 country or place units from 1995 to 2024, using a synth did design.

what was measured
What changed
  • Morales era indicator
  • Hydrocarbon rents share income
What we checked
  • Log income pc constant
  • Extreme poverty headcount
  • Inequality index
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/bolivia_morales_resource_nationalism_2006_2019
1007550250199520102024BOLECUPERCOLBRAARGPRY
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show log_gdp_pc_constant across 8 sampled countries over 1995–2024.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for bolivia_morales_resource_nationalism_2006_2019. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/bolivia_morales_resource_nationalism_2006_2019/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit 098ce96 · 2026-04-30T12:57:33Z
run generated · 2026-04-30T10:15:29Z

Bolivia's 2006-2019 Morales-MAS era (May 2006 hydrocarbons nationalisation, renegotiated gas-export contracts with Brazil and Argentina, expansion of cash-transfer programmes Bono Juancito Pinto and Renta Dignidad, fixed-currency-peg-style stabilisation, large social investment) produced a measurable poverty-reduction and growth record relative to a Latin American resource-dependent peer pool. The pre-registered claim is (a) cumulative log real-GDP per capita 2006-2019 is at or above the LATAM median, AND (b) extreme- poverty headcount falls by at least 15 percentage points 2005-2019, AND (c) public-investment share of GDP rises at least 4 percentage points relative to peer median. The mechanism is that resource-rent capture combined with currency stability and fiscal-discipline features produced a rare macroeconomically stable redistribution.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Not supported if (a) cumulative log_gdp_pc 2006-2019 (BOL minus synth) is < 0, OR (b) extreme_poverty_headcount fall is less than 15 percentage points, OR (c) the non-hydrocarbon real-GDP component does not grow faster than the LATAM median (so the apparent gains are entirely terms-of-trade-driven).

formal test & threshold
test:      synth_did_plus_poverty_plus_non_hydrocarbon_decomposition
threshold: cumulative_log_gdp_pc(BOL, 2006-2019) - cumulative_log_gdp_pc(synth, 2006-2019) >= 0 AND extreme_poverty_headcount(BOL, 2005) - extreme_poverty_headcount(BOL, 2019) >= 15 AND non_hydrocarbon_log_gdp_growth(BOL, 2006-2019) - non_hydrocarbon_log_gdp_growth(LATAM_median) >= 0

Method

Template
synth_did
Clustering
country
Sample
8 countries · 1995 – 2024
Evidence type
causal

Primary: synth_did with BOL treated from 2006, peer pool of resource-dependent LATAM economies. Secondary: pre-post on poverty-headcount with terms-of-trade decomposition. Tertiary: decomposition of GDP gain into hydrocarbon-rent share vs non-hydrocarbon GDP.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
log_gdp_pc_constant
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KDtier 2
log
extreme_poverty_headcount
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SI.POV.DDAYtier 2
level
gini_index
outcome
world_bank_wdi:SI.POV.GINItier 2
level
gross_capital_formation_share_gdp
outcome
world_bank_wdi:NE.GDI.TOTL.ZStier 2
level
morales_era_indicator
treatment
constructed:binary = 1 for BOL from 2006 onwardtier 5
binary
hydrocarbon_rents_share_gdp
treatment
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZStier 2
level
oil_price
control
fred:DCOILBRENTEUtier 1
log_level
natural_gas_price
control
fred:PNGASEUUSDMtier 1
log_level
us_policy_rate
control
fred:FEDFUNDStier 1
level
terms_of_trade
control
world_bank_wdi:TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WDtier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — bolivia_morales_resource_nationalism_2006_2019

Verdict: PARTIAL — mean_gap=-1.048, |gap|/pre_sd=25, p_perm=0.25 (gap below 0.5×pre_sd or placebo p≥0.10)

Pre-registration

  • Claim: Bolivia's 2006-2019 Morales-MAS era (May 2006 hydrocarbons nationalisation, renegotiated gas-export contracts with Brazil and Argentina, expansion of cash-transfer programmes Bono Juancito Pinto and Renta Dignidad, fixed-currency-peg-style stabilisation, large social investment) produced a measurable poverty-reduction and growth record relative to a Latin American resource-dependent peer pool. The pre-registered claim is (a) cumulative log real-GDP per capita 2006-2019 is at or above the LATAM median, AND (b) extreme- poverty headcount falls by at least 15 percentage points 2005-2019, AND (c) public-investment share of GDP rises at least 4 percentage points relative to peer median. The mechanism is that resource-rent capture combined with currency stability and fiscal-discipline features produced a rare macroeconomically stable redistribution.
  • Falsification rule: Not supported if (a) cumulative log_gdp_pc 2006-2019 (BOL minus synth) is < 0, OR (b) extreme_poverty_headcount fall is less than 15 percentage points, OR (c) the non-hydrocarbon real-GDP component does not grow faster than the LATAM median (so the apparent gains are entirely terms-of-trade-driven).

Synthetic-control estimate

  • shape: synth_did
  • treated_country: BOL
  • event_year: 2006
  • n_donors: 7
  • donor_weights (top): {'BRA': 0.6086, 'PER': 0.3092, 'ARG': 0.0822, 'ECU': 0.0, 'COL': 0.0}
  • pre_rmse: 1.0420676880306166
  • pre_period_sd: 0.04126126218276877
  • mean_post_gap: -1.0484689631383453
  • end_period_gap: -1.0587307327619495
  • post_period_years: [2006, 2024]
  • placebo_p_value: 0.25
  • n_placebos: 7
  • method: synthetic-control via NNLS, permutation inference

Variables resolved

  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.PCAP.KD → log_gdp_pc_constant (outcome, n=14131)
  • world_bank_wdi:SI.POV.GINI → gini_index (outcome, n=2430)

Generated by scripts/run_synth_did.py at 2026-04-30T10:15:29+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

WDI poverty data for Bolivia is intermittent; spec uses available poverty-survey years and accepts gaps in the level series.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.