IESET.
Hypotheses·welfare architecture·activation_sanctions_reemployment_duration_panel

In OECD unemployment-insurance panels from 1995 to 2023, stronger job-search conditionality and enforceable sanction regimes predict shorter unemployment duration and higher reemployment among benefit recipients at a given replacement rate.

The directional claim is that stricter activation conditionality is associated with at least a 0.5 percentage-point lower long-term-unemployment share, conditional on benefit generosity, ALMP spending, GDP growth, and employment protection.

INCONCLUSIVEengine/runs/activation_sanctions_reemployment_duration_panel

INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:benefits_and_wages_jobsearch_conditionality', 'oecd:benefits_and_wages_sanction_rules']

confidence cueResult card produced; verdict unclassified.

policy briefCoverage too thin

In ordinary language

In plain terms, this asks whether activation conditionality strictness is actually linked to better or worse long term unemployment share from 1995 to 2023.

plain answer

This test cannot make a firm call yet. no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:benefits_and_wages_jobsearch_conditionality', 'oecd:benefits_and_wages_sanction_rules']

why it matters

This matters because welfare architecture claims should change belief only when they survive a pre-declared empirical test.

how the test works

It compares 38 country or place units from 1995 to 2023, using a panel fe design, with fixed effects for country and year.

what was measured
What changed
  • Activation conditionality strictness
  • Sanction enforcement indicator
What we checked
  • Long term unemployment share
  • Unemployment rate
  • Employment to population ratio
what this does not prove

A single test is not the whole truth. It narrows the claim under a specific sample, time period, and method. Strong policy conclusions need the pattern to survive nearby tests, alternative data, and serious objections.

verification

No evidence packet has been generated yet.

Results

engine/runs/activation_sanctions_reemployment_duration_panel
1007550250199520092023AUSAUTBELCANCHECHLCOL
illustrative sketch · run pending
No coefficients yet. When the model fires, this chart will show long_term_unemployment_share across 38 sampled countries over 1995–2023.
The shapes above are stylised — none of the lines are real data.
Placeholder for activation_sanctions_reemployment_duration_panel. Published chart will be generated from engine/runs/activation_sanctions_reemployment_duration_panel/chart_data.json.

Pre-registration

pre-registered
first-spec commit e29141a · 2026-05-22T17:36:53Z
run generated · 2026-06-29T17:54:45Z

In OECD unemployment-insurance panels from 1995 to 2023, stronger job-search conditionality and enforceable sanction regimes predict shorter unemployment duration and higher reemployment among benefit recipients at a given replacement rate. The directional claim is that stricter activation conditionality is associated with at least a 0.5 percentage-point lower long-term-unemployment share, conditional on benefit generosity, ALMP spending, GDP growth, and employment protection.

Falsification criterion — what would disprove this

set before the run · honoured after

This hypothesis is considered falsified if:

Refuted if stricter conditionality does not reduce long-term unemployment, or if any apparent reduction is explained entirely by benefit exits without a positive employment-to-population response. A rise in non-employment outside registered unemployment is treated as refutation rather than support.

formal test & threshold
test:      panel_fe_activation_sanctions_reemployment_duration
threshold: beta_conditionality_long_term_unemployment <= -0.5pp and beta_conditionality_employment_to_population > 0

Method

Template
panel_fe
Fixed effects
country, year
Clustering
country
Sample
38 countries · 1995 – 2023
Evidence type
associational

Two-way FE with conditionality strictness and replacement rates entered jointly. Robustness checks split monitoring requirements from sanctions, control for ALMP spending intensity, and test whether effects vanish when job-search assistance is absent.

Data

VariableSourceTransform
long_term_unemployment_share
outcome
ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_DUR_RT_Atier 2
level_pct
unemployment_rate
outcome
ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2
level_pct
employment_to_population_ratio
outcome
ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_Atier 2
level_pct
activation_conditionality_strictness
treatment
oecd:benefits_and_wages_jobsearch_conditionalitytier 2
index
sanction_enforcement_indicator
treatment
oecd:benefits_and_wages_sanction_rulestier 2
indicator
net_replacement_rate
control
oecd:TaxBEN_net_replacement_ratetier 2
level_pct
almp_spending_gdp
control
oecd:DSD_SOCXtier 2
level_pct_gdp
real_gdp_growth
control
world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZGtier 2
level_pct
epl_strictness
control
oecd:EPL_OVtier 2
level

● ready  · ● pending  · ● reconstruct-needed

Detailed result card

Result card — activation_sanctions_reemployment_duration_panel

Verdict: INCONCLUSIVE_DATA_PENDING — no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:benefits_and_wages_jobsearch_conditionality', 'oecd:benefits_and_wages_sanction_rules']

Pre-registration

  • Claim: In OECD unemployment-insurance panels from 1995 to 2023, stronger job-search conditionality and enforceable sanction regimes predict shorter unemployment duration and higher reemployment among benefit recipients at a given replacement rate. The directional claim is that stricter activation conditionality is associated with at least a 0.5 percentage-point lower long-term-unemployment share, conditional on benefit generosity, ALMP spending, GDP growth, and employment protection.
  • Falsification rule: Refuted if stricter conditionality does not reduce long-term unemployment, or if any apparent reduction is explained entirely by benefit exits without a positive employment-to-population response. A rise in non-employment outside registered unemployment is treated as refutation rather than support.
  • Falsification test: panel_fe_activation_sanctions_reemployment_duration

Estimate

  • Error: no treatment variable loaded; missing: ['oecd:benefits_and_wages_jobsearch_conditionality', 'oecd:benefits_and_wages_sanction_rules']

Variables resolved

  • ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_A → unemployment_rate (outcome, publisher=ilostat, n=10188)
  • ilostat:EMP_2EMP_SEX_AGE_RT_A → employment_to_population_ratio (outcome, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=8071)
  • oecd:DSD_SOCX@DF_SOCX_AGG → almp_spending_gdp (controls, publisher=oecd, n=1404)
  • world_bank_wdi:NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG → real_gdp_growth (controls, publisher=world_bank_wdi, n=13897)
  • oecd:EPL_OV → epl_strictness (controls, publisher=oecd, n=1123)

Variables missing data

  • ilostat:UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_DUR_RT_A (outcome, name=long_term_unemployment_share) — vintage not on disk
  • oecd:benefits_and_wages_jobsearch_conditionality (treatment, name=activation_conditionality_strictness) — vintage not on disk
  • oecd:benefits_and_wages_sanction_rules (treatment, name=sanction_enforcement_indicator) — vintage not on disk
  • oecd:TaxBEN_net_replacement_rate (controls, name=net_replacement_rate) — vintage not on disk

Generated by scripts/run_panel_fe.py at 2026-06-29T17:54:45+00:00

Strongest opposing argument

Every hypothesis ships with its charitable opposing argument. The framework earns credibility by handling objections at their strongest, not weakest.

Notes

Candidate Worker C spec testing welfare conditionality as a work-incentive mechanism, not as a moral claim about recipients.

Authored framework. Read the transparency note.